276 Remarks to Members of a Special Seminar of the Foreign Service Institute. *July* 3, 1962

I WANT to welcome you all to the White House and to tell you that I am very appreciative to have a chance to say a word to you. This is a matter in which I have been greatly interested, and with the support of General Taylor, our Military Representative at the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the AID Agency, CIA, and the other groups in Government, we have been attempting to put a good deal more emphasis in recent months on this problem of counter-insurgency. It has so many ramifications, as you know from your analysis of it, and it requires a mastery of so many different areas of national, international life that it has required, I know, study by all of you at the Foreign Service Institute, and will require continued analysis by all of you, I hope, after you graduate, so that we can improve our courses.

The Foreign Service Institute has done an excellent job in laying this out. We are anxious that all of the military colleges emphasize this phase of our struggle. We are anxious that beginning really at the three military academies, that they attempt to inculcate an interest in this phase of military life. We are anxious that all those who are promoted in the career services of the Foreign Service itself, of the CIA, and the AID agency and the military departments, that all of them, particularly the senior officers, have had at least some contact with this subject at various schools so that we become really far more expert than we have ever been in the past.

This most ancient form of warfare, going back as it has to its earliest beginnings, has become far more important than it has ever been in the past, and it is going to become more important in the future. As the great weapons become more deadly and as more and more nations possess them, there will be of course, as has been very clearly pointed out by those who make themselves our adversaries, more and more emphasis on this kind of war, insurgency, guerrilla, and the other kind of struggle, the so-called wars of liberation. So that as the thermonuclear weapons get higher and higher in their megatonnage, and as there becomes less and less occasion to use them, then of course there will be more and more emphasis on this kind of struggle. This is not merely a military effort, but it also requires, as I have said, a broad knowledge of the whole development effort of a country, the whole technique of the National Government to identify themselves with the aspirations of people.

The problem, of course, that we face is that in so much of the world the problems that the people face are so staggering, and there is no immediate answer to them. The United States does not have sufficient capital itself to make an immediate imprint. We can join the countries and encourage them and offer them hope and indicate that they are moving, but even in a country with the resources of Mexico, with the population increasing nearly 3½ percent, with 1 out of every 20 children getting beyond the sixth grade, and a country with the highest standard of living in Latin America, we can see how serious are the problems that so much of the world faces. And therefore this technique of the guerrilla, where you need only one guerrilla, and it requires 15 or 20 troops to track him down, and where you have so much misery which can be exploited, offers a very effective weapon for the overthrow of legitimate governments.

We sometimes take some encouragement in the fact that there are so many obvious evidences of a desire of people to be free and a desire of people to maintain their anti-Communist position. What we realize, and I am sure you realize, is the technique of the Communists which emphasizes organization, which requires comparatively few

President Kennedy's Address at a meeting of the American Foreign Service Association

the non-career Ambassador—not for political reasons, but when he happens to be the best man available. For example, Mr. Reischauer happens to have special skills in Japan; he has a knowledge of Japanese and of the history of the country, and he has a Japanese wife. I had only met Mr. Reischauer when he came to call on me to go to Japan. But his was a distinguished appointment, and to a country which has an intellectual tradition. My feeling is we should send career men, to the maximum extent possible, unless there happen to be special skills which a non-career officer holds.

On the other hand, the career men themselves have to be of the best quality. You cannot expect any President or Secretary of State, merely to please the career officers, to send a career officer to a post if he is not the best. He should be the best. After 10 or 20 years in the Service, he should be the best, in language, in knowledge, in experience. He should be able to stand up to any competition. If we get the best we can get in the Foreign Service at the beginning, every post will go to a Foreign Service officer. I am sure that all a Foreign Service officer asks is to be judged fairly, without bringing in extraneous circumstances, on this basis of judgment: who is the best man for that post at that time, given the situation in the United States and the situation in that country? That should be the standard.

Now in some cases it will be a noncareer appointment, but in many cases, in my judgment, we will end up with the best man available, and he will be a Foreign Service officer.

Lastly, I want to say one word about the next year or so. We are in a very changing period. Our policies are changing, and should change, and we are very much dependent upon the Department of State for action, for speed, for judgment, and for ideas. I know the difficulty of attempting to clear policy and of coordinating it between the Department of State, the CIA, the Defense Department, the White House, the Export-Import Bank, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, and the Congress. But nevertheless, it does seem to me that in the days that are coming, we want, first, action in the sense that we should bring these matters to a head and do it with speed if we can. And still more, we need a sense of responsibility and judgment in order to get the work out—not action for action's sake. We must not become so enmeshed in our bureaucracy that four or five over-burdened men make decisions which should come from the Department itself with some speed and action.

Another point, of course, is that we should have, at least at the White House, Department of State, and Secretary of State levels, evidence of dissent and controversy. We have had some new ideas in the last year in foreign policy; some new approaches have been made. We want them to come out of the State Department with more speed. What opportunities do we have to improve our policies abroad? How, for example can we make the Alliance for Progress more effective? We are waiting for you to come forward, because we want you to know that I regard the Office of the Presidency and the White House, and the Secretary of State and the Department, as part of one chain, not separate but united, and committed to the maintenance of an effective foreign policy for the United States of America.

Therefore, in the final analysis, it depends on you.

That is why I believe this is the best period to be a Foreign Service officer. That is why I believe that the best talent that we have should come into the Foreign Service, because you today—even more than any other branch of Government—are in the front line in every country of the world.

NOTE: The President spoke at a private luncheon of the Association at the Sheraton-Park Hotel in Washington on May 31. The excerpts from his address, published in the July issue of the Foreign Service Journal under the title "The Great Period of the Foreign Service," were released by the White House on July 2.

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to the U.N. on their part. They feel that this plan is preferable. But in my judgment it would mean that the United Nations would be faced with attempting to pay back $100 million in 3 years. I don't think that there is any evidence that they can do it. It would have to be submitted to the General Assembly to be voted upon after they voted upon a different plan. The smaller nations definitely could not contribute to it, and in my judgment it would be back in our lap at the end of 3 years.

Now, the General Assembly has moved. We are moving on a plan which I think offers a hope of success. As I say, already a number of countries have met their responsibility. We hope they'll go higher to the $100 million. I think we ought to go ahead and I'm hopeful the Senate and the House will, because in my judgment failure to go ahead in this ground is going to mean a collapse of this special effort, and then what's going to happen in the Congo and the Middle East? I think it would be a great mistake, and I'm hopeful that the Senate will consider it very carefully.

In my judgment, every survey shows that 80 to 85 percent of the American people realize the importance of the United Nations. And this is vital to the life of the United Nations, this issue.

Q. Mr. President, on the bond issue again, when you sent your message up to Congress you said that the proceeds of the bond issue would be used to liquidate the debts of the United Nations for the Congo and Middle East operations. And a few days later when Mr. Rusk went up, he said that the proceeds would be used to pay for these two operations for 18 months beginning next July 1st. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was not able to get this straightened out in testimony. I wonder if you could state what the——

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't—I think—I'm not familiar with—I'm not aware that there is a disagreement between the statement that I made and Mr. Rusk made. I'd have to check his testimony and my statement to see if there was a disagreement. But there is a debt, and there will be need for funds. And therefore it seems to me that in a sense both positions are in accordance with the—both Mr. Rusk's statement and my statement are not exclusive. We're going—this goes to meet the debts, and to maintain these special operations for the next 18 months.

[6.] Q. Mr. President, there seems to be some continuing difference of opinion between yourself and Mr. Nixon, and I wondered if, in view of yesterday's statement, you feel that the CIA should have briefed you about the Cuban operation during the 1960 campaign?

THE PRESIDENT. I thought that yesterday's statements by the White House and by Mr. Dulles were very clear, and I think that closes the matter as far as I'm concerned.

[7.] Q. Sir, about this agreement that the U.N. Committee is now working on to get peaceful uses for outer space for the United States and other nations—it has been mentioned several times that this agreement would be patterned after the Antarctic Agreement, and, if so, would this not mean that we would give up any future scientific or territorial gains and would have to submit to inspection by foreign nations? And how would you separate your peaceful uses from your military uses, because wouldn't all of these scientific gains go together?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it's hard to—I would say that this is a—I had not heard this comparison. I'm not sure that there is a precise comparison between the Antarctic and outer space. I do think that this is a matter that will be negotiated. I think that the interests of our country will be protected in that negotiation. I can assure you, in fact, they will be. But we are anxious to assure, if possible, that outer space is used peacefully in order to protect the interests of the United States. So I think we should go into the negotiations and see if it's possible for us to cooperate, because there's

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one-half of 1 percent, I think, which has only happened in this decade once, in 1955.

There's not an excessively high level of inventory buildup. I think that Mr. Heller, who has spoken on this matter, who I do not consider a natural optimist—I think he's been speaking what he believes. And therefore I think that this economy has more vitality in it than some of its premature mourners.

[6.] Q. Mr. President, now that you have seen all the available evidence in the Powers case, do you agree with Representative Vinson that Mr. Powers' U–2 was shot down at 68,000 feet by a ground launched rocket?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think that the report of the CIA and the comments—the statements which Mr. Powers made, it seems to me, dealt with this matter. I have no other information beyond what you have seen in those two matters.

Q. Sir, I meant that Representative Vinson said the CIA believes that he was shot down by a rocket fired from the ground. I was wondering if you have any comment on that.

THE PRESIDENT. I don't have any comment beyond what the CIA has said and what Mr. Powers himself has said.

[7.] Q. Mr. President, could you define for us what might be acceptable at Geneva as a safeguard against secret preparations for testing, and specifically whether this would include an increase in onsite inspections?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think that the American negotiators at Geneva will have some suggestions to make in that area, and as this conference is going to begin in a week, I believe it would be preferable to let them make their proposals at that time.

[8.] Q. Mr. President, you have said, and I think more than once, that heads of government should not go to the summit to negotiate agreements, but only to approve agreements negotiated at a lower level. Now it's being said and written that you are going to eat those words, and go to a summit without any agreement at a lower level. Has your position changed, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I'm going to have a dinner for all of the people who've written it, and we'll see who eats what. [*Laughter*]

Let me state that I would go to the summit if—as you've stated—if some agreements had been made which could be climaxed most effectively by a summit meeting. I've also stated at an earlier press conference if I thought a trip to the summit might avert a war or if we were faced with an extremely dangerous situation, then I think it would be appropriate to go to the summit without prior agreements. But I think to go to the summit without having an understanding of what is going to be accomplished there, and some meeting of minds, I think disappoints rather than helps the cause, and that's why I've held the view that I do, and that's why I continue to hold it, and that's why I am looking forward to the spring.

[9.] Q. Mr. President, since a number of governments have expressed their support for either nuclear free zones in different parts of the world or for a so-called non-nuclear club—among those governments, aside from the socialist communities, there is Brazil, Ireland, and Sweden—what are your feelings, sir, about those proposals, and what would be the position of the United States Government at the Geneva disarmament conference in this respect?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think there are two or three different points in the question. I think the United States—I said at the United Nations that I thought it would be desirable to come to some agreement in regard to the transfer of nuclear weapons from one country to another. Now, when we get into—so that's one position which the United States has already taken and indicates its support of. Your other question was in regard to a nuclear free zone, and that, it seems to me, is a matter which must be examined. What else will be in the zone? What other forces will be in the zone? Where will this zone be? These are matters, I think, that could—will be discussed, I imagine, along with many other matters

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additions that could be made to it, but that is the basic thesis on which we've been acting since last April.

[5.] Q. Mr. President, in the past year you have had an experience with a whole variety of diplomacy and forms of diplomacy. Could you tell us what your thoughts are now on the practice of summitry?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, my view is the same as it has been, and that is that a summit is not a place to carry on negotiations which involve details, and that a summit should be a place where perhaps agreements which have been achieved at a lower level could be finally, officially approved by the heads of government, or if there was a major crisis which threatened to involve us all in a war, there might be a need for a summit. But my general view would be that we should climb to the summit after careful preparation at the lower levels.

[6.] Q. Mr. President, Nelson Rockefeller on Sunday said that in his view the results of Punta del Este amounted to a diplomatic failure for the United States. Is there anything you would have to say on that?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I disagree. I think that all of the countries of the hemisphere together made a finding that Cuba and the Communist system were not—should not be considered part of the inter-American system. And in my opinion that was a most important declaration, because it put the inter-American system squarely and unanimously against Communist infiltration. So that I do have a different view of the results, even though there's a division, of course, among countries as there is bound to be, as to the best methods of containing the expansion of communism. But on the general opposition to its expansion in this hemisphere, I think there was unanimity, and I regard that as most important.

[7.] Q. Mr. President, some Congressmen are again critical of the fact that they don't know how much they're voting for CIA or, due to the fact that the requests are hidden in other budgets, even when they're voting on CIA. Does this have any validity, do you think?

THE PRESIDENT. The budget for the CIA is handled by the members of the Appropriations Committee of the House and Senate. It's bipartisan, and includes members who are the most senior and the most experienced in the area. They are fully informed. Quite obviously, there are some limitations on what we're able to reveal in the national interest, but in my judgment the budgetary procedures which have been followed in the past have combined congressional responsibility and also protection of our vital interests.

[8.] Q. This being Valentine's Day, sir, do you think it might be a good idea if you would call Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina down to the White House for a heart-to-heart talk—[*laughter*]—about the whole disagreement over the censorship of the military speeches and what he calls your defeatist foreign policy?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think that that meeting should be probably prepared at a lower level—[*laughter*]—and then we could have a——

[9.] Q. Mr. President, the Republican National Committee publication has said that you have been less than candid with the American people as to how deeply we are involved in Viet-Nam. Could you throw any more light on that?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, as you know, the United States for more than a decade has been assisting the government, the people of Viet-Nam, to maintain their independence. Way back in December 23, 1950, we signed a military assistance agreement with France and with Indochina which at that time included Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. We also signed in December of 1951 an agreement directly with Viet-Nam.

Now, in 1954, the Geneva agreements were signed and while we did not sign those agreements nevertheless Under Secretary Bedell Smith stated that he would view any renewal of the aggression in Viet-Nam in violation of the aforesaid agreements with

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into that, and see if the freeway could be put further out beyond the park?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I will. [*Laughter*] You're very gentle today, Mrs. Craig.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, does the United States intend to precondition the purchase of the $100 million of United Nations bonds on support of the other $100 million by other countries, and, if so, would not such a precondition serve to raise a question of earnestness in the support of the U.N. by all nations?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I think there's an obvious relationship between the amount that we purchase and the amount that other countries take. We stated that we would take—that we would consider taking $100 million worth of the bonds. It was our hope that other countries would take $100 million, I think the Canadians have indicated around $7 million, and the British $12 million, and I think the Scandinavian countries have given it careful consideration. I think Mr. Black, of the World Bank, has written to other governments, so that in answer to your question, there is a relationship obviously between what we could do and what others will do. I'm hopeful that both will meet their responsibilities in the matter.

[13.] Q. Mr. President, in the debate just terminated in the Senate over the confirmation of John McCone as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a considerable body of opinion indicated that they were concerned about the supervision over CIA. Have you done anything in your administration to increase Executive supervision over CIA, and what is your view toward giving Congress a greater share over the supervision of CIA?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, as you know, Congress does have groups that have a responsibility over CIA. They provide the budget, and they also provide—receive reports and confer and exercise supervision at the present time.

Secondly, I appointed General Taylor some months ago to be my representative in regard to matters affecting intelligence, and there are intergovernmental meetings in response to any activities that CIA might carry out with general supervision and it's a matter which has concerned me personally increasingly. So that those are the areas where there is control and I think it's up to all those who have control, as well as to Mr. McCone and the members of the CIA, to attempt to carry out their functions in a way which serves our interest, which I'm sure is their objective.

[14.] Q. Mr. President, speaking of going to Moscow, could you tell us under what conditions you would accept an invitation to visit the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT. I would think that an invitation—and an acceptance of an invitation—would probably wait on the easing of the tensions which unfortunately surround our relationship. And so that, for the present, of course, until we have significant breakthroughs, that sort of journey would probably not be considered useful by either country. But we, of course, are always hopeful and we're making every effort that we can to bring an easing of tensions. And that's why Mr. Thompson is pursuing his course, and that's why we are making the other efforts that we're making.

[15.] Q. Mr. President, could you tell us whether you expect any difficulty in Congress with your Alliance for Progress program by reason of the opposition of some of the bigger Latin American countries at the Punta del Este conference?

THE PRESIDENT. I think that I could probably—the Congress, of course, has to make that judgment. In my opinion, the program is very essential; I think it was endorsed by 20 nations, the Alliance for Progress. This is a long struggle to improve the life of the people in this hemisphere. I think we must go ahead, and I'm confident that the Members of the Congress when they come back will feel the same way. So that what has happened recently, in my opinion, makes more desirable and essential the Alliance for